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Ir
is the common attitude of philosophers of art to say that it has
no intrinsic ethical obligation at the moment of conception
:
that it is the expression simply of a certain idea, recollection, revery,
dream or nspiration ; that the ethical consideration only enters the
situation after the work has been completed and the public begins to
discuss its merits or otherwise take an active interest in its meaning,
symbolism, usefulness or artistic significance. This, I believe, is the
usual error of a false psychologism, to overlook the fact that any
artistic idea or inspired conception, when it is genuine and not a
mere caricature, has a moral origin, and in that measure at least is
the beginning of a spiritual creative process which is ethical and con-
scientious to the last stroke of the brush, chisel, graver or pen. Of
course we know that the long-haired cubists and futurists are usu-
ally quite unmindful of the moral or ethical bearing of their work,
but how many of them enjoy such tokens of love and immortality
as we give to those scrupulous geniuses who have given us the
classical traditions, the Renaissant style, or the valid modern syncre-
tisms? These artists are immortal because they tvere conscientious
and exercised a scrupulous sense of ethical values throughout the
course of their work ; they did not try to wheedle fame and fortune
out of any sham romanticism, ugly art, or symbolized profanity. No
moral-minded artist ever feels that he is inspired at all if he has no
more than these to give his genius creative power.
The eristic, however, is proverbiallv adamant. He will argue
that the logical end of anv certain psvchic activitv f which includes
art creation) need not necessarilv be a worthy end in the ethical
sense, nor even an end of an\ positive melioristic value. Pie might
as well go on and sav that an artist's Avork need not necessarily be
artistic, nor have any other purpose than to gratifv the artist's desire
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to give his idea external representation regardless of whether it is
vulgar and ugly or beautiful and exemplary. Such a notion is as irra-
tional and imbecile as it is antisocial and rhyomistic ; we are too
lenient if we only say it is ridiculous and unconscional)le. If the said
psychic activity started out with some malicious aim and selfish
assumption of rights or relative deserts, and was pursued only in
view and counsel of these until it did at last realize its forward pur-
pose, its ena ( being concerned in nothing beyond the bare consum-
mation of this purpose) could be considered logical enough in itself
and by itself, but would by no manner, means or subterfuge of soph-
ist apology be truly justified or proven morally and socially defens-
ible. Readily enough could it be logically whole and valid to tliat
extent, but that shoud not satisfy a true philosophy of the action
because, on further examination, we would find that its pursuit was
(juite unethical, morally monstrous and socially criminal. And I
believe that such latter findings would soon serve to show us whether
the activitv was even worthy and permissible, much less artistically
creative or melioristic.
Artists are still human beings, even though lost in revery or
dreamy inspiration, and it is human to have some sense of responsi-
bility aljout whate\er we think or plan to do. Even the criminal
takes care that no one has opportunity to prove his responsibility
for the crmie : he himself feels that he is responsible but he does not
want anyone else to feel that way, for his days are numbered as
soon as they do. \\'hether artist, laborer, saint or sage, the consci-
entious individual has ever before him the problem of how to hold
himself duty-bound and responsible ; e\'er conscious of and contribu-
tory to that regulative social demand that whatever he thinks or does
shall be good, constructive and useful instead of malicious, destruc-
tive or harmful to society. This is his sense of ethical responsibility,
and if he has it to start wnth it will always be a factor in his every
thought or inspiration and will not cease to operate just because he
happens to be an artist or aims to preserve the logical end of his
activities. He knows that the empirical adequacy of his ideals and
aims must be conjoined with a higher moral and social adequacy so
that the development of his mental powers and the synthesizing of
his aestheti: conations will be validated in view of ethical standards
and sublimated in view of a richer nobler spirituelle. Tf he does this
often enough it will soon become his habitual metier and there will
be no actual antinomy between his purpose and his conscience, be-
tween his performance and his ordinary respect for others. And if
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he is normally intelligent, even though not intelligent and erudite on
the philosophical scale, he will be able to see that if all his neighbors
and fellow men in the world shared the same progressive rectitude
of aim and solicitude of conscience there would soon be little moral
failure left to differentiate our human destiny from that grander cos-
mic teleology which is the meliorism of the world.
Autotelic art guarantees from the start that there shall be no
compromise or spoliation ; but not the autotelic artist or patron of
art. for with them the whole apocalypse and genesis of aesthetic
beauty are taken as existing only for their personal ends or pleasure.
Bentham must have really been reading Nature through a reflector
instead of a refractor when he made excuses for hedonism as against
ascetic virtue and gave other questionable sanctions to this carica-
ture of human spiritual power. He should have remembered that
famous Pythagorean maxim: "Look not in a mirror by a torch."
His work in jurisprudence (public ethics) and morality (private
ethics) could have proven the summum bonum to consist in the
highest welfare and happiness of the greatest number, without so
heavily cartooning human nature with algedonic deformities. If
the true nature and end of art is autotelic. then the artist who aims
to be worthy of his genius, as well as the patron who anxiously pre-
serves his intelligence and aesthetic sympathies, should be willing
to consecrate their spirits to art for its own sake and not their own.
As soon as they turn back and begin to use art to gratify their own
desire or pleasure. I feel sorry for the future of that particular age
of art.
A philosophical logistic of morality and art may be pursued in
two general directions : the analytical-reductive and the synthetic-
constructive : and each of these in turn mav be pursued under the
heads of pre-logical analysis and post-logical synthesis. Thus their
common functions in the cultural series can be intelligently appre-
ciated and shown to be both complementarv in aim and supplemen-
tary in practical sanction and support. Tn the simple apodictic func-
tion of the first reductive pursuit we have paradigmatic analyses by
example and associative allegory grounded in empirical symbolism,
while in the complex function of the constructive pursuit we have
analogical syntheses bv means of convergent unity, homogeneous
experience, equality of ratios, inductive cognates and proportional
syllogisms. And subdividing these functions into their anterior and
posterior logical phases, we have for the first a reductive paralogical
analysis into divergent plurality, heterogeneous experience, dispar-
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ity of perceptive or associative ratios, and various singular prob-
lematic thrills ; while for the second synthetic construction we have
factitious anagoge, hermeneutic interpretation, Cabalism, theopathic
experience and mystic sublimation, the complex functions of which
may arise from both fair and unfair assumptions, being partly valid
and partly invalid in their deductive cognates, and turning on both
anagogic and apogogic (or dyslogistic) proportions. But all the while
we are pursuing this technical explication we should not lose sight
of those simpler relations which the actual practice of morality and
pursuit of art are bound to force upon our process of assumption
and debate. It is these less noticeable relations, I believe, which are
really essential features, perhaps also vital factors even, in whatever
philosophical procedure we may devise, for we will continue hav-
ing those very positive public entities called morality and art regard-
less of how analyze or interpret them.
In the drawing of any such parallel between morality and art it
is indicated that though both aspire to the same ideal of cultural
meliorism, yet in the pursuit of this ideal aspiration one seeks after
the external, and the other after the internal economy and effect of
such pursuit. On the individualist scale this is to say that there is an
objective and a subjective pursuit of the cultural affections which
pass under the general terms ethic and aesthetic, and that each of
these has a public and a private phase of pursuit. On the more
social, cosmopolitan scale it means that the subjective affections and
delights are given inferior importance relative to those items of
otherness-than-ourselves which signify the public welfare and
through this the enlightenment and ennoblement of all humanity.
The position I wish to stress is that both manners of approach and
procedure are melioristic through progressive culture, and do not
rest content with a mere self-satisfaction or superficial hedonism.
The latter do not even represent an intelligent individualism, so
how could the same tactics pass on to represent an enlightened mor-
alism in cosmopolitan culture? The latter is the field of real ethics,
while the former is the field of pseudo-ethics as Aristotle demon-
strated long ago.
The realism of morality and art is what permits them to be
described and translated in normative as well as formative terms.
If Spencer had been a realist he would not have seen any occasion
for saying they were subjects for descriptive but not normative sci-
ence to interpret. It is under aspect of this very realism that man's
sense of duty joins forces with his consciousness of beauty in the
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external world (normal and formal justice, or subjective and objec-
tive symmetry) and strive together against his less noble disposition
in favor of self-pampering desires and satisfactorist sanctions. Thus
the science of reality is both normative and descriptive because it
examines and seeks to understand both the internal and external
aspects of spiritual activity which result in morality and art. These
two phases of scientific application we call ethics and aesthetics, and
ever since Plato adumbrated their relations and common goal as the
beautiful and good (kalokagathia) we have felt sure that the same
essential encratic scruples applied to all genuine love of beauty and
virtue whether they marked man's action or man's creative expres-
sion. Hence there is a taxis or symmetry between these two prov-
inces of the human spirituelle, as when they overlap in a moral
aesthetic of good art or in the aesthetic morality of "beautiful and
heroic deeds of valor" ; and when we try to hold them apart as being
distinct and disjunctive activities, neither one can be seen as fair
and good to man's genuine cultural advantage.
While Aristotle's empiricism regarding kalology or theory of
beauty (as in his poetics) did not permit him to recognize a pure
aesthetic or philosophy of the beautiful, sublime, unique or pictur-
esque, because these were aesthetic emotions rather than separate
entities, yei he did allow that poetry, which is perhaps the first of
man's active aesthetic predilections, is for his intellect the straightest
road to pure thought, and took the Pythagorean value of music,
which is the first of man's passive aesthetic predilections, as being
for his soul the magic realm wherein are found both the profound
and the sublime in ideal harmonies. Meanwhile he claimed that the
plastic arts (sculpture, painting and architecture) are still bedrag-
gled in materialism, still limited to the pseudo-art of an anthropo-
morphic symbology. and under threat of gradual suffocation are
breathing heavily under the yoke of a finite aspiration. Fortunatelv
they have survived thus far and have even progressed in some few
instances regardless of the finitude of their svmbolism and aspira-
tion, for the slightest aspiration, even when finite or automorphic
of its author, is yet an eventual item in the full program of aesthetic
interpretation. Nothing that is in the least aspirant toward better
things can justly be left out of the chronicle of man's cultural melior-
ism because, as Hegel said, out of a transcendental aesthetic pure
reason brings only an eternal aspiration, and in the infinite variety of
such eternal functioning we should expect no stoppage, no surcease
of progressive effort or ambition. The kanon of Polyclitus. Ros-
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setti's shell or Hogarth's li)ic of beauty were only meant to inspire
our own creative power to carry on the torch, not rest our lazy arms
upon the palette and smear the colors where they don't l)elong.
This is intended to show us how a free and \-arious prologue
to an actual aesthetic morality introduces us to the ethical argument
of social responsibility and personal scruples of conscience as being
prime necessities to the genuine pursuit of cither morality or art.
^^'e are lead in fact to consider these ethical values under two of
their most prominent aesthetic aspects, viz: first, the utilitarian, that
is, how well adapted to man's use, instruction, delight or legislation,
showing that mere pleasure-seeking and satisfaction make up one
only of the lesser aims in morality and art ; second, the teleological,
that is, how highly appreciative of the purpose of life, man's destiny
in the cosmic order, man's contribution to the melioristic conjunction
of body and soul as a better form of existence than bare insentient
materialism. Under either aspect it will be readily seen that an
honest and constructive eschatology is the best field from which to
derive criteria for judging what are fair and unfair, valid and in-
valid, durable and ephemeral values in either morality or art : we
cannot even get at the true utilitarian valuism without carrying our
inquiry to the point where ends decide the adequacy of means. At
this point there is no real distinction between what is individual or
particular and what is social or cosmic because the same theory of
ends will cover both fields of value ; the same aspiration and sense
of responsibilitv will control both spheres of interest and activity,
whether the dominant function is ethical or artistic. And after a
few years' discipline it will not be difficult to see that the felicity-
interpretation is inaderiuate to cover both ends and means when we
consider man's cultural function in its dual role of ethic and aes-
thetic, but that the melioristic code has sufficient scope to include
both teleologv and utilitv in its theorv of human culture and spiritual
refinement.
But an inquiry of this dimension proceeds on the ground that
the discretion which sees the common cultural function of morality
and art is itself a imit in the constituency of human nature and the
melioristic purpose of life ; it is the p-rnund in philosoohv which
says that the universe is homogeneous in its function and its ends,
no matter how multifarious its forms nor how heterogeneous its
structure, because first causes are rational and persistent while the
so-called final causes are onlv empiricallv dative nnd hence ephem-
eral. Thus we sav that a man is an artist or a moral agent when
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he meets this homogeneous requirement that both the function and
the end of his activity shall bear values of meliorism, constructive-
ness, idealism and sincerity of spiritual affection rather than those of
pejorism, destructiveness, spoliation or vulgar commercial applica-
tions. His proper end in pursuit of the moral aesthetic is neither
utilitarian self-interest nor romantic sentimentalism, but a clear dis-
cretion and courageous will to be reasonable and make all his works
and deeds symmetrical with all else that is orderly and good, beau-
tiful and exemplary in the world. By so conducting himself he will
get back to the fountain head of true spiritual life and show that
Locke's objections to the "innate practical principles" were directed
only against those which bore an empirical stamp and did not dis-
pute those lofty ideas which are the bulwark of our culture and our
spiritual progress in the world.
From all this is seems that the proposition that the foundation
of a philosophical ethic should be one which underlies both the em-
pirical and romantic (utilitarian and hedonistic) is not wholly inde-
fensible nor wanting in credentials at the bar of common spiritual
law. The rules of three and pageantry that have attended the his-
torical course of morality and art prove how readily they may be
based upon either ascetic or romantic motives, but the end to which
this various motivation led proves which sort of procedure guaran-
teed the richest result, the noblest and most durable achievement.
The romantic procedure truly enough produced the most pleasant
and delightful results, but they were far more shallow and ephem-
eral than those of the ascetic and rigoristic persuasion because they
failed to come by the actual knowledge of disinterested morality and
art by living them day after day as did the ascetic, monk or hermit.
In this there w'as a deeper spiritual communion and refinement than
was ever reached by the hedonist's sensory empiricism and false
felicity. Hence, with the truer aesthetic basis of a philosophical
ethic squared to the ground of spiritual facts and cultural acts, we
are in better position to concern ourselves with the determination
of those less-utilitarian but mnre-teleological and melioristic values
which are essential to such qualifications as merit, generositv, beauty,
justice, sim.plicity, honor, inspiration, private counsel or social ad-
vantage. The proposition is that we begin to see that the will-to-
betterment which these values signify comes of a purer spiritual
stock than do the merely animaloid pursuits of pleasure, utility or
satisfaction ; it is verily the soul of morality and art, for without it
they soon lapse back into mere selfishness and hedonism.
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There is, however, a second consideration of the points of joint-
ure and disjunction between ethics and aesthetics which may as
above intimated start from what we discern and relish as moral con-
duct and beautiful things. Taking moral conduct to be beautiful
human activity, it permits of various pursuits equally in rectitude
regarding their intimacy with conscientious duty: that is, for in-
stance, that though the various races and nations have different
moral codes, yet their intimacy with or duty toward such standards
as they have is what concerns the rectitude of those pursuits even
as they vary one from the other. This rectitude in each particular
case may be determined from how it co-ordinates in effecting an
efficient preservation of the social organism in its striving toward
betterment and a realizing of its determining power amidst the ethi-
cal and artistic pluralism. On a scientific basis the co-ordination of
the world'.^, various moral criteria with the equally various codes of
art appreciation (a necessity left undetermined by both Bentham and
Pater's hedonism, and not sufficientlv sublimated in ^^lill's utility-
valuism) must involve a constant and homogeneous adjustment of
each particular standard, so as to maintain what Professor Green
used to call "the will to know what is true, to make what is beauti-
ful, to endure pain and fear, and to resist the allurements of pleas-
ure, all in the interest of some progressive and melioristic form of
human society."
Thus may we see wherefrom a conception of what is beautiful
in morality and what is moral in beautv can be derived, not by any
specious abolition of the superficial distinction supposed to exist
betw-een the moral and the aesthetic activity, but bv mutual trans-
lation, that form of cultural identitv wherein each is interpreted in
terms of the other. Some of these common terms being sense of
duty, responsibilitv. innocence, beautv. generositv. justice, nobilitv.
sanity, serenity and sympathetic feeling; and the honest activity in
line with their pattern wdll pmduce no ugly art nor selfish individ-
ualism because thev are positive terms in a progressive melioristic
series and counsel no false ideal nor orectic urgencv. And again,
it was not a valid distinction which Kant made between Avhat is ben-
evolentlv imperative and what is privatelv urgent, because we can
see that it is not a contradiction for us to regard ourselves as in
dut}^ bound to promote the welfare or cultural improvement of
others in order that our own lives may be more peaceful and secure.
Public and private moralitv have the same, not different, rules and
regulations which guarantee safety and social order: as Kant him-
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self later said, "the ends of any subject which is an end in himself
ought as far as possible to be my ends also, if the conception of him
as an end m himself is to have its full effect with me." Hence, in
either an approbative ethic or a moral aesthetic we do well to con-
cern ourselves in knowing wherein another requires our aid or in-
spiration, and to discern the direction in which an helpful service
will be the most eft'ective and conducive to carry on the vital evolu-
tionary process of humanity in general.
Elihu Root has recently said that "the things one has an oppor-
tunity to do are substance, while the things one tries to get are shad-
ows" ; whence under the proposition of an equable benevolence there
is a poise or judicial balance of motive that puts it before us under
an aesthetic aspect and rules that so far as morality and art are con-
cerned man's pronominal goods shall have subjective and objective
but no possessive case. If there is any empirical point around which
ethics and aesthetics may revolve in a mutually braced and cross-
referenced union, it must surely be this of moral beauty or the
rationally balanced ethical motive which eventuates in generous
doing or creating, never in selfish getting and owning. It may at
least be viewed as a permissible philosophical union for the purpose
of showing how these two fields of cultural activity may be made
to co-ordinate in furthering man's spiritual evolution, encouraging
his shy fidelity and inspiring his as-yet-too-worldly aspiration to
make vital transcription of the eternal verities. It might show also the
necessity for some sort of valid conception of the laws of beauty and
duty as criteria for art appreciation as well as for ethical approba-
tion, for it is for the most part the same sort of conduct which makes
men good artists and useful citizens, only their talents are dift"erently
applied. At least the proof of such validity would come out in the
results of a thorough aesthetic education where the genius and taste
for beauty, as well as the ability and conscientious will-to-justice,
would create just those works or achievements which are the crown-
ing glory of human artifice and virtue.
An intuitive ethic, in holding that the human conscience is able
to assign immediate moral values to any presented action, may very
well be accused of presupposing that such presented action has a
moral value which it may recognize. But this manner of attack is
itself unjust, in that it itself presupposes a "right and wrong" dil-
emma in +he presupposition which it seeks to attack, and therein
rer|uires, even for itself, the defense of an intuitive ethic. Now
if there really are any immediate a priori judgments which w^e re-
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tain, while forgetting the logical processes which led to them, they
are not actually a posteriori (though they may very well be so, theo-
retically) because their recollection in time of need is not the result
of an experienceable logical process, but rather may be and often is
quite as immediate and non-empirically reasoned as is any other
intuition a priori. And with such an intuition Jiof of an absolutist,
undevelopable nature, its derivation should not be the ground of
our intolerance toward its influence on either ethical, aesthetic or
even epistemological conceptions. Hence, whatever in an ethical
connection approximates to an excellency of deportment in any
human activity, is in that degree aesthetic in the sense of being
noble, generous, unworldly, benevolent and beautiful, and is there-
fore subject to the same inquisitive analysis and critical appreciation
which we spply in the methodical interpretation of the sublime, the
good, and magnanimous, the beautiful, and all else whereof we seek
a knowledge and a cherishing.
The aesthetical teaching of Plotinus was that the beauty we see
in the external world results from the infusion into and superiority
of spirit over matter, while in ourselves the sense of beauty comes
of the mastering of soul over physical desires ; and that either situa-
tion is knowable to us because such spiritual prerogatives demon-
strate the operation of reason in nature. The ecstasy we experience
upon examining an object results from our confidence and appre-
ciation that it has an inherent beauty, that it is beautiful in itself
regardless of any ideas we may have as to its use, fate, pedigree or
progeny, 'rebelling and Tieck. Schopenhauer and Carlyle. those sweet
and sour romanticists respectively, revived this phase of Neoplaton-
ism when they practically agreed, thoiigh in positive and in negative
terms respectively, that art has primary need of moral nobility if
it is to be real and durable art. In Tieck's opinion, "it is a noble
aim to produce a work of art that transcends the utilities of life, a
work of beauty which shines forth with its own splendor and com-
plete in itself. The instinct to produce such a work more directly
points to a higher world than any other instinct of our nature." And
Schopenhauer agreed with him in even stronger, though negative
terms, saying: "A Avork of genius is not a thing of utility. To be
useless is its very patent of nobilitv. Tt exists for itself alone."
Under the ensign of morality and art every phase of our cultural
emprise should take care to be honest, legal and devout : for without
these credentials on our vovage we will b^ve misprablv failed in the
venture of life even though we brine back bo^^h Holv Grail and
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Golden Fleece. It is not enough either to work out technical and
logically perfect schematisms of what a moral aesthetic ought to
be if during the procedure we neglected the actual practice of our
own aesthetic morality. We must bring both intellectual discern-
ment and emotional sobriety, both moral discrimination and spiritual
aspiration, to the scene of our work else whatever we think or do,
plan or create, will be in some way angular and hysterical, ugly and
repulsive. Of course, both positive and negative aspects of the
adjectival predication would be read in everything substantial we
tried to do, but whenever we limited our creative function to real-
izing those works and achievements only which were just and good,
melioristically useful and inspiring, we would begin to take part in
the grand spectacle of Progress, that eternal procession whose main
event (for us) is the cultural redemption and spiritual transfigura-
tion of man.
